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Regulating access to the disability 
grant in South Africa, 1990-2013 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Disability is a universally difficult concept to define and assess for social 
assistance and social insurance purposes and these benefits have proven 
difficult to administer internationally because of ambiguities present in the 
process of determining the employability of people with physical impairments. 
In post-apartheid South Africa, disability grants (DGs) have proved especially 
difficult to regulate because of the added complexities of high levels of 
structural unemployment and poverty, an HIV epidemic and a social security 
system which does not cater adequately for all groups in need of support. The 
paper identifies three periods in the state’s attempts to improve DG 
administration through legislative and regulatory measures since 1990: 1) a 
period of extending access and overcoming administrative barriers, supported 
by a socio-economic rights discourse; 2) a period of growth and generous 
access, resulting in growing concern about over-generosity and fiscal 
sustainability; 3) a period of action or ‘rationalisation’ in which the state places 
new limits on access to the grants, leading to decline in the number of social 
grant recipients. Common to all three periods are numerous and ongoing 
problems in the disability assessment process. These exist because disability is a 
complex, multi-dimensional concept, which is difficult and expensive to properly 
assess, especially in a context of high demand and significant resource 
limitations within the healthcare system.  
 
 
Introduction  
 
Over the past 10 years the South African disability grant has received significant 
attention in academic, civil society, media and government circles, largely 
because it has raised major questions about social development and poverty 
alleviation strategies that extend well beyond concerns about disability. The 
administration of the grant has also raised serious questions about who should be 
considered disabled and the purpose of social security in the context of chronic 
illness (Macgregor, 2010).  This paper sets out to examine the development of 
disability grant (DG) policy and regulations in post-apartheid South Africa and 
in doing so, explore understandings of disability, as well as how the rights of the 
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sick and disabled to social security have been negotiated and decided by 
policymakers and legislators in government.  
 
The South African disability grant is a non-contributory, means-tested cash 
transfer of R1290 (as of October 2013), available on a permanent or temporary 
basis to people deemed unfit to work as a result of functional impairment and 
who do not have sufficient other means of support. As of July 2013, the South 
African Social Security Agency (SASSA) awards the DG to 1.14 million people 
– or approximately 3.4 percent of the working age population.1 SASSA also 
administers two other disability-related grants, the Grant-in-Aid and Care 
Dependency Grant, paid to caregivers of disabled adults or children who are in 
need of permanent care but this paper will focus exclusively on the DG. South 
Africa is unusual amongst developing countries for having such an established 
and generous disability grant program (Gooding & Marriot, 2009). Social 
assistance targeted specifically at disabled people is more common in developed 
welfare states, where lower levels of unemployment and absolute poverty are 
present, and where typically these programmes are supported by social 
assistance for the chronically ill and better social insurance coverage. The South 
African DG exists in quite a different space and high unemployment, together 
with an HIV epidemic, has complicated targeting and regulation of the grant.  
 
Hansen & Sait (2012) argue that the process of conceptualising disability in 
South Africa can be divided into two distinct phases: a period of reconciliation 
(1994 - 2001) when discrimination and subjective experiences of disabled 
people came into play and the focus was ‘extending grants to those in need 
rather than to ask the question of who was in need’ (2012: 96). The second phase 
(2001 onwards) represents a period of controlling access to the grant when the 
discourse of dependency was invoked along with a narrower biomedical 
conception of disability and a focus on who is disabled. However, this analysis 
overlooks the fact that in 2001 disability assessment was in fact adapted to 
incorporate a more social understanding of disability.  This led to an 
unprecedented growth in DG beneficiaries until 2004, where a narrower, strictly 
biomedical model of disability was reintroduced. 
 
This paper therefore argues that there have in fact been three phases to how 
disability grants have been managed by the state.  The first phase represents a 
period of extending access and overcoming administrative barriers, supported by 
a ‘rights’ and administrative justice discourse. This was followed by a period of 
growth and generous access (2001 – 2007), resulting in growing concern about 
over-generosity and fiscal sustainability. This culminated in a set of actions by 
                                           
1
 According to the 2011 Census, 33.2 million people are of working age (between 16 and 35)  
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the state that places new limits on access to the grants and a period of decline in 
the number of social grant recipients from 2007 onwards. 
  
 
The disability grant system at the end of 
apartheid 
 
 
Grant uptake and welfare spending 
 
Cash transfers targeted specifically at people with disabilities have a relatively 
long history in South Africa and social assistance for disabled people was first 
introduced through the Blind Persons Act (Act 11 of 1936) and the Invalidity 
Pension Scheme, which the Department of Welfare offered to white South 
Africans from 1937 onwards.
2
 The Disability Grants Act (Act 36 of 1946) 
formalised this scheme in the form of a disability grant made available to white, 
coloured, Indian and black people. The applications of both of these Acts and 
their later iterations were complex and the means test criteria and amounts paid 
to the defined racial groups varied enormously. In 1946 disabled white people 
were offered 60 pounds a year whilst black people, who received substantially 
less than all of the other groups were offered only 12 pounds a year (Disability 
Grants Act 36 of 1946). White applicants became eligible for the grant if their 
disability was expected to last 6 months or more but DGs were only awarded to 
black applicants if the disability was certified for a period of 12 months or more 
(Baron, 1992).  
 
From the 1970s onwards, racial differences in the value of benefits were reduced 
as the real value of pensions for black people rose whilst they fell for the white 
population. The difference between white and African disability grants 
decreased from 7:1 (R28:R4) in 1965/6 to 1.2:1 (R354:R293) in 1992/1993 
(Race Relations Survey 1991/1992 in Lawrence, 1992). By 1990 white people 
accounted for only 23 percent of welfare spending, whilst coloured and Indian 
people received 24 percent and black people 52 percent (Kruger, 1992; 
Terreblanche, 2003; Van der Walt, 2000 in Visser, 2004: 5). In 1991 the 
government made commitments to parity in terms of the Social Pensions Act 37 
of 1973. Discrimination in benefit levels based on race was finally eliminated 
and equal benefits were extended to all South African citizens through the South 
African Social Assistance Act of 1992 and parity in disability grants and other 
benefits was reached in 1993 (Ardington and Lund, 1995). 
 
                                           
2
 This was never formally legislated.  
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Although social grants formed approximately 96 percent of the social welfare 
budget in 1990 (Lund, 1990), the system of grants and pensions was 
‘organisational chaos’ (Matisonn and Seekings, 2003). In the final years of 
apartheid the social grants system was composed of 14 different departments 
serving different population groups and homeland bureaucracies (Department of 
Welfare, 1997a). Both Lund (1992, 1997) and Van der Berg (1997) warn of the 
gaps and inaccuracies of social grant data in the early 1990s.
3
 As beneficiary 
data was held by the various welfare administrations rather than centrally and 
because data in the homeland was not computerised, few consolidated statistics 
on beneficiary numbers exist (Lund, 1992). Breaking down welfare spending 
according to grant type is also challenging as not all of the homeland or TBVC 
states differentiated between pensions and disability grant spending in their 
records.
4
 As a result, much of the data over this period was based on estimates, 
especially data from the independent TBVC states. Lund (1992) analysed 
estimates of expenditure, auditor general reports, parliamentary debates and 
policy speeches and interviewed members of various government departments, 
finding significant discrepancies in the information on social grants provided by 
these sources. Table 1 below presents spending on disability grants in 1990 
based on the best available data. No accurate data on the number of DG 
beneficiaries over this period appears to exist.
5
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
3
 An attempt has been made to note all discrepancies in disability grant data found during the 
course of writing this paper and, where possible, provide explanations for these differences. 
This information is presented in the footnotes and summarised in the appendix at the end of 
the paper.  
 
4
 It is also difficult to compare disability grant figures because it is not always clear when the 
disability grant has been grouped together with other disability related grants available at the 
time (blind persons grant, leprosy grant and single-care grant).   
 
5
 The only data on beneficiary numbers available is reported in the South African Institute for 
Race Relation survey, which cites a 1992 report from the Human Science Research Council. 
The report claimed that 803 000 people received the DG in 1990/1991 and that a total of 3.9 
million people received social grants over this period, representing R4.43 billion of 
expenditure. Unfortunately no proper reference to this report was given and it cannot be 
located. However based on data from 1993 and 1994, which estimate the number of DG 
beneficiaries to be around 500 000, it appears that the beneficiary numbers reported by the 
HSRC are inflated.  
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Table 1 Amount spend on disability grant payments in Rand 1990 
 
Tri-cameral  368 278 000 
Provinces 197 824 000 
Homelands 158 714 000 
Independent States 102 876 000 
Total  827 692 000 
 
Source: Lund, 1992  
 
Between 1991 and 1995, the welfare budget grew faster than any other 
government department (22.6% per annum) as a result of equalising benefits 
(Ardington and Lund, 1995). As a result, there was concern about the growing 
welfare ‘burden’ and social security reform was informed by a need to manage 
costs leading to a push to ‘rationalise’ the social grant system (Department of 
Welfare, 1994) and increase administrative efficiency.   
 
In January 1992, the New Social Welfare Dispensation for the Republic of South 
Africa document outlined the development of a new welfare policy that would 
incorporate welfare policy under a number of umbrella Acts, increase the 
allocation of social welfare services from 1.6 to 3.2 percent of GDP and achieve 
full parity of social grants by 1 April 1996, which was generally rejected by 
welfare organisations. This led to the promulgation of the Social Assistance Act 
59 of 1992.  
 
 
The Social Assistance Act of 1992 
 
The Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 was passed in parliament in May 1992 
and repealed the Social Pensions Act 37 of 1973, the War Veterans’ Pensions 
Act of 1968, the Disability Grants Act 27 of 1968, the Social Aid (House of 
Assembly) Act 37 of 1989 and various welfare acts promulgated by the formerly 
independent homeland states. The Blind Persons Act 26 of 1968 was not 
repealed through this act or amended by later legislation and social assistance 
for blind people appears to have been incorporated under general disability in 
the Social Assistance Act of 1992. No legislation governed the administration of 
the leprosy grant and in 1992 only a tiny number of people were receiving the 
leprosy grant as the disease had almost completely disappeared in South Africa 
(Lund, 1992).
6
.  
 
                                           
6
 There was less than 1 case of leprosy per 10,000 people, which the World Health 
Organisation considers elimination of the disease.  
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The Social Assistance Bill, which was initially proposed in February 1992, had 
faced widespread criticism from civil society and the ANC, which called for the 
withdrawal of the Bill because it removed the statutory right to grants by giving 
the Director-General discretion over payment through the Section 6(3) which 
read: ‘If the Director-General is of the opinion that the applicant is entitled to the 
social assistance applied for, he may authorize the rendering of the relevant 
social assistance’ (emphasis own). The Bill was however passed with Section 
6(3) intact. Although the Department of National Health and Welfare responded 
that anyone who satisfied the prescribed conditions would be eligible, the 
concern remained that the insertion of this clause was intended to limit the 
payment of pensions and would reduce security for the elderly and people with 
disabilities (SAIRR, 1993; Ardington and Lund, 1995).
7
  
 
Other than eliminating racial disparities and increasing the age of eligibility 
from 16 to 18, the 1992 Social Assistance Act changed little in the way that 
disability grants were managed or the disability assessment process. 
Discrimination within the system remained due to inefficiencies and inequities 
in service delivery.  
 
 
Attempts by the post-apartheid government to 
extend access and overcome administrative 
barriers: 1994-2001  
 
On coming to power, the new ANC government committed itself to building a 
social welfare system that promised ‘the attainment of basic social welfare rights 
for all South Africans, irrespective of race, colour, religion, gender and physical 
disability, through the establishment of a democratically-determined, just and 
effective social delivery system’ (Republic of South Africa, 1994: 2.13). 
However, the administrative complexities of the previous system and poor 
capacity for delivering social security services, especially in more rural areas, 
made this an extremely challenging task. In the case of the disability grant, 
existing administrative difficulties were compounded by the complicated nature 
of identifying and targeting beneficiaries who were particularly marginalised 
and were doubly discriminated against by the apartheid system in terms of both 
race and their disabilities (Nkeli, 1998).    
 
                                           
7
 The applicant for a social grant has no substantive right to receive a grant in terms of the 
SAA, but from 1996 had the right of access to social assistance in terms of s 27(1)(c) of the 
1996 Constitution (de Villiers, 2002: 322).  
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The apartheid government was notoriously secretive and its systems extremely 
complex and over-bureaucratised and at the end of apartheid little was known 
about the social policy in South Africa and no intensive studies on the social 
security system or policies existed (Lund, 1997). Given this massive learning 
curve, policy makers faced significant challenges in conceptualising a system 
for the new South Africa that was both just and affordable.  
 
 
Difficulties in managing a messy system  
 
When the ANC government took power in 1994, poverty and inequality were 
massive problems and 52 percent of the population accounted for less than 10 
percent of total income, whilst 6 percent of the population captured 40 percent 
of income (Taylor Committee, 2002). However, despite this prolific poverty, 
grants were awarded to only 2.4 million out of a population of 40 million people 
(Seekings and Matisonn, 2010).
8
 The new government therefore faced the 
daunting task of both consolidating and extending the complex and 
discriminatory administrative structures inherited from the previous regime. The 
existing social security system it inherited was fragmented, inequitable and 
administratively inefficient and was designed to serve a minority of the 
population.  
 
Given low levels of unemployment in the white population, the system was 
focused on providing unemployment insurance to white people working in the 
formal labour market, with social assistance only forming a residual ‘safety net’ 
function for specifically targeted categories of people considered vulnerable to 
poverty, namely disabled people, children and the elderly (Liebenberg, 2007 in 
Brockerhoff, 2010: 8). This design did not take into account the large numbers 
of previously excluded poor and unemployed black people (Woolard et al., 
2010). Service delivery structures of the social welfare system were based on the 
British and American models, which were inappropriate to the South African 
political, economic and socio-cultural context (Patel, 1992: 46). However, 
budget constraints made re-imagining a new system fairly challenging. In the six 
years after apartheid a series of commissions were assembled to examine how to 
re-structure the existing system: the Chikane Committee for Restructuring 
Social Security (1996), the Lund Committee on Child and Family Support 
                                           
8
 This conflicts with other data the 1994 Annual Report of the Department of Welfare, which 
reported there were 3.6 million recipients and grants represented 86% of social welfare 
budget. Van Der Berg (1997) suggests there were 2 532 700 social grant beneficiaries in 
1993. According to the South African Race Relations Survey, the Department of National 
Health and Population Development reported that there were a total of 2 634 218 grant 
beneficiaries in September 1993 and 2 768 077 in September 1994. 
 
8 
 
(1996), the Public Service Commission Investigation into Social Security 
Services (1998) and the Taylor Committee on Comprehensive Social Security 
for South Africa (2000
9
).  
 
The draft White Paper for Social Welfare, published in 1995 and adopted by 
cabinet in 1997, outlines the creation of a developmental social welfare system 
in-line with the goals and strategies of the government’s Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP). The White Paper was aimed at guiding the 
consolidation of welfare policy. Apartheid legislation was largely developed in 
an ad hoc fashion, reflecting reactions to particular issues and the White Paper 
for Social Welfare attempts to set the tone for more comprehensive and 
consultative welfare policy: ‘A comprehensive and integrated social security 
policy is needed to give effect to the Constitutional right to social 
security’’(Department of Welfare, 1997a: 55). 
 
The White Paper acknowledges that welfare services were underfunded and 
sought to increase welfare spending and the number of social grant beneficiaries 
over time, reintroducing promises of a universal social security system.  
 
‘There will be universal access to an integrated and sustainable social 
security system. Every South African should have a minimum income, 
sufficient to meet basic subsistence needs, and should not have to live 
below minimum acceptable standards. The social security system will 
also work intersectorally to alleviate poverty’ (Department of Welfare, 
1997a: 33). 
 
Although there was clear recognition within government that government 
needed to extend access to social assistance, there was also a need to address the 
wasteful expenditure caused by the inefficiencies and confusion within the 
highly disjointed existing system. To this end, in 1995 the Department of 
Welfare began a project to amalgamate and clean up social grant records of the 
14 different systems into one national database. In 1997 the Cabinet instructed 
the Department of Welfare to undertake a national re-registration drive intended 
to reduce fraud and discrepancies in the system and a national social security 
system was phased in from 1 April 1998. The clean-up process included 
removing deceased beneficiaries (ghost beneficiaries) and duplicates from the 
system as well as Temporary Disability Grants (TDGs) that had not been 
cancelled. Prior to 1998, disability pensions could only be terminated after an 
annual medical review and if the person concerned was less than 100 percent 
                                           
9
 The commission was assembled in 2000 but the findings of the report were only published 
in 2002.   
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disabled. In 1998, amendments to the Regulations of the Social Assistance Act 
59 of 1992 provided for the automatic lapsing of temporary disability grants 
granted before 1998. 
 
Between July 1997 and February 1998, 60 000 ghost beneficiaries were 
removed from the system and 45 000 TDGs were suspended. As a result of these 
efforts, between August 1997 and August 1998 there was a 17.8 percent 
decrease in the number of DG beneficiaries (Department of Finance, 1998 in 
Bredenkamp, 2001) and from 1997 to 1999 the number of disability grant 
recipients dropped from 732 322 to 631 372. Although the clean-up process 
resulted in significant savings for the Department of Welfare, administrative 
problems in carrying out the re-registration -- poor communication about the 
process as well as the lack of identity documents of many beneficiaries -- caused 
massive financial stress for those whose grants were suspended or cancelled, 
especially in rural areas.   
 
The blanket cancellations of temporary disability grants and the grants of 
‘suspect’ beneficiaries without notice over this period resulted in litigation by 
beneficiaries in which judgment was given in favour of the applicants (Olivier 
and Mpedi, 2009).
10
  
 
 
Poor coverage of the population eligible for the 
disability grant   
 
Although the efforts to improve administration were effective in reducing the 
number of illegitimate beneficiaries in the system, in 2001 the Director of Social 
Grants in the Department of Social Welfare acknowledged that the number of 
social grant beneficiaries was only a small fraction of the total number of 
eligible individuals (Makiwane, 11 September 2001). There were also additional 
barriers to access specific to the administration of the disability grant that 
needed to be addressed. This is recognised in the post-apartheid government’s 
initial proposals for managing disability and social security issues in South 
Africa - the Integrated Disability Strategy White Paper (1997) and the White 
Paper on Social Welfare (1997):  
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 These cases included: Bushula and others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, 
Eastern Cape and another 2000 (2) SA 849 (E) (van Rensburg J); Rangani v Superintendent-
General, Department of Health and Welfare, Northern Province 1999 (4) SA 385 (T) (Kirk-
Cohen J); Bacela v MEC for Welfare (Eastern Cape Provincial Government) 1998 1 All SA 
525 (E); Mpofu v MEC Welfare and Population Development, Gauteng and Another JD 0833 
(W), (Mpofu).  
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‘People who receive social security benefits in South Africa tend to be 
totally dependent on them for their survival. The majority of people 
with disabilities, however, receive no grant at all.’ (Office of the 
Deputy President, 1997) 
 
‘The present social security legislative framework, its administration 
and allocation systems, tend to be discriminatory, punitive, insensitive 
to the specific needs of people with disabilities, uncoordinated, 
inadequate and riddled with high levels of fraud’ (Office of the 
Deputy President, 1997). 
 
In 1993 only 593 162 people, or 1.6 percent of the total population and 30 
percent of the people with disabilities received the disability grant (Office of the 
Deputy President, 1997; SAIRR, 1995).
11
 Although not all disabled people 
would necessarily be eligible for the grant, it is likely that uptake of the grant 
was low relative to the number of disabled persons living in poverty, largely 
because of punitive means testing and medical assessment processes 
(Department of Welfare, 1997a).  
 
Coverage of black South Africans with disabilities was relatively low compared 
to coloured and Indian people, despite a higher prevalence of disability and high 
likelihood of unemployment within this group (see Table 2 below). This is likely 
because of discriminatory practices during apartheid as well as spatial 
discrimination because of lower literacy levels and poor access to welfare 
services within rural areas.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
11
 Data from Van Der Berg (1997) suggests that only 499 200 received the grant in 1993. This 
data was sourced from the Department of National Department Population Development. 
However, according to the SAIRR Race Relations Survey of 1995, in September 1993 the 
Department of National Health and Population Development reported that there were a total 
of 548 224 DG beneficiaries and a total of 2 634 218 grant beneficiaries overall and 593 162 
in September 1994 and 2 768 077 total beneficiaries. Please see appendix for further notes.  
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Table 2 Disability grant coverage by population group 
 
Population 
group 
Number of DG 
recipients per 1000 
people in population 
(1997) 
% Disability 
in population 
(1999) 
% of disabled 
people 
employed full-
time (1999) 
White 8 5.7% 19% 
Indian 23 4.7% 9% 
Coloured  31 4.5% 4% 
Black 12 6.1% 6%  
 
Source: Van Der Berg, 1997 and Schneider et al., 1999 in Bredenkamp, 2001. 
 
  
Problems of accessibility   
 
The social grant system in the early 1990s was both inaccessible and ‘ironically 
over-administered’ (Lund, 1997: 9). In 1997 the Community Agency for Social 
Enquiry (CASE) was commissioned by the Department of Welfare to research 
social security policy options for people with disabilities. As part of this work 
CASE convened a task team that included representatives from the disability 
sector
12
 and the Department of Welfare. The report (Schneider and Marshall, 
1998) was entirely qualitative and primary data collection, conducted in the 
Eastern Cape, Gauteng, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, included focus 
groups and life story narratives developed through interviews. The research 
explored the experiences of disabled people and the parents of disabled children 
in accessing the Disability Grant and Care Dependency Grant, how the grants 
are used, as well as the assessment process itself. The report found that 
administrative inefficiencies presented a serious barrier to accessing the grant. 
Beneficiaries reported that the application process was frustrating and complex 
and that the success of an application frequently depended on being lucky 
enough to find a sympathetic official (Schneider and Marshall, 1998: 44). In 
focus groups run with healthcare professionals responsible for assessing grants 
for private insurance companies and the DG, assessors pointed out the 
challenges disabled people face in navigating the application process: 
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 This included representatives from Disabled Persons South Africa, Rural Development and 
Disability Helpline, Disabled Children Action Group, National Council for Persons with 
Physical Disabilities in SA, Office of the Status of Disabled People, Black Sash and South 
African Federal Council on Disability 
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‘We’ve joked in the past at our hospital that if you can actually get 
through the whole system, get to all the places and see all the people, 
you probably aren’t disabled enough to qualify.’ (Medical assessor in 
Schneider and Marshall, 1998: 50) 
 
Black Sash, which provided paralegal advice on social security issues, reported 
that Disability grant enquiries constituted 60 percent of the advice given by their 
paralegals (Black Sash, 2000a). This was likely a result of high demand for the 
grant, challenges faced by those seeking access to the grant and the suspension 
of disability grants without notice.  
 
At the time all disability grant forms were filled out by Medical Officers (MOs) 
and assessed by Pension Medical Officers (PMOs), who were employed by the 
state to oversee the administration of disability grants from a medical 
perspective. This practice was criticised for creating significant backlogs 
(Baron, 1992) and for allowing PMOs to make important decisions affecting 
patient welfare without actually examining patients (Simchowitz, 2004). The 
massive shortage of medical doctors available to perform assessments in rural 
areas also lead to significant assessment backlogs in some provinces. The 
Department of Welfare estimated that in 2000 there was a backlog of 86,951 
grants across the country (see Table 3 below). The Eastern Cape and Northern 
Province faced the largest backlogs.  
 
Table 3 Backlogs per province as of May 2000  
 
KwaZulu-Natal  10000 
Eastern Cape   30000 
Mpumalanga  6000 
Gauteng  2951 
Northern Cape  400 
Western Cape  500 
North West   7000 
Northern Province 30000 
Free State       100 
Total 86951 
              
Source: Department of Welfare, 2000a 
 
Based on the policy that no one should wait longer than three months for a grant, 
payment of arrears was restricted to three months regardless of how long an 
applicant waited to receive their grant (South African Federation for Mental 
Health, 1999; Black Sash, 2000a). Although this policy was meant to incentivise 
administrators to speed up the application process, given the backlogs discussed, 
13 
 
delays in administering grants were common and another study by CASE found 
that only 27 percent of DG applicants received their grants within the stipulated 
three months (Schneider et al., 1999).  
 
Physical access and transport to welfare offices for applications and collection 
of payments was often challenging and expensive for disabled or very ill people 
who had mobility issues and for whom the costs of transport or the time spent in 
long queues proved physically difficult. People who had moved from their 
hometowns had to travel back to these towns to collect their grant money 
(Schneider and Marshall, 1998).  
 
Temporary disability grant applicants were often not told that their grants were 
temporary and their records were often deleted completely from the system 
without notice, forcing recipients to apply and wait without support for several 
months whilst their new applications were processed from scratch. The right to 
appeal grant refusals or cancellations was poorly understood by many applicants 
and beneficiaries. The appeals system itself was also deeply faulty and 
inconsistent and significant backlogs existed in the appeals process (de Villiers, 
2006).  
 
Inefficiencies and inequities in grant administration such as those discussed 
above undermined the constitutional requirement of lawful and reasonable 
administrative action outlined in Section 33 of the Bill of Rights in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 108 of 1996 and the Promotion 
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 that expanded on this right. This lead to 
litigation by the Legal Resource Centre and the Black Sash against the 
Department of Social Development on behalf of applicants and beneficiaries 
facing delays and cancellations (Black Sash, 2000b; Makiwane, Social 
Development Portfolio Committee, 21 June 2000; Department of Welfare, 
2000a).
13
 One of the most prominent cases over this time was the class action 
brought forward by the Legal Resources Centre on behalf of Ngxuza and two 
other defendants as well, as 37,000 other temporary grant beneficiaries in the 
Eastern Cape, who had their disability grants suspended or cancelled without 
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 This included Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza and others 2001 (4) SA 1184 
(SCA) discussed on page 9 as well as Mashishi and others v the Minister of Social 
Development and others, unreported Transvaal Provincial Division case number (4239/03) 
2003. Mbanga v MEC for Welfare (2001) 8 BCLR 821 (SE) and Nomala v Permanent 
Secretary, Department of Welfare (2001) 8 BCLR 844 (E) (the State-provided social 
assistance grant must be made within a reasonable time of application). The Department of 
Social Welfare (2000a) reported that litigation against the department at the time included a 
class action of approximately 30 000 cases in the Eastern Cape (Ngxuza) and another 150 
cases in the Gauteng.  
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proper procedure or notice (Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape v Ngxuza and 
others 2001 (4) SA 1184 (SCA)).  
 
 
Problems in DG Assessment  
 
The disability grant assessment process has been the most problematic and 
contentious aspect of regulating access to the DG. In the 1990s difficulties in the 
assessment process included: the lack of a proper definition of disability for 
social assistance purposes; a lack of standardised assessment tools; inconsistent 
and subjective application of assessment tools; the medical focus of the 
assessment process, which did not take social or environmental factors into 
account; and a shortage of medical doctors to perform assessments, especially in 
rural areas.  
 
 
Lack of definition 
 
Disability is a complex, multidimensional concept and it has been difficult to 
create a universally encompassing definition of disability, which has led to 
confusion and misuse of disability terms (Altman, 2001).  
 
It is not easy to make binary distinctions between disabled and non-disabled 
people and there are a variety of different definitions, models and tools for 
understanding and measuring disability, which are used for very different 
purposes, from allocating rights to social security benefits to public health 
planning. Various models of disability have existed over time, including the 
individual or medical model, the charity model, the social model, the 
administrative model and the human rights model.  
 
The two dominant models of disability, the medical and the social model, exist 
as dichotomous concepts and significant debate exists within the disability 
studies literature around how disability and related ideas about impairment 
should be conceptualised. In the medical or individual model of disability, or 
what Oliver (1990) calls ‘personal tragedy theory’, disability is seen as directly 
related to the functional limitations of the individual or physical handicap - a 
personal tragedy in a society of normal people (Ross and Deverell, 2010; 
Priestly, 2006). The individual/medical model typically categorises people 
according to labels such as deaf, blind and crippled. As a result of this labelling, 
the individual and his or her social identity become conflated with their medical 
condition. The social model of disability, promoted by disability rights activists, 
considers disability to be a social issue that stems from the characteristics of a 
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disabling society such as discrimination, prejudice and inadequate services and 
infrastructure rather than from a function of physical impairment (Gathiram, 
2008). As a result, ‘disability ceases to be something that a person has, and 
becomes instead something that is done to a person’ (Swain et al., 2003: 23) and 
is considered a form of social oppression (Oliver, 1990). South Africa’s White 
Paper on an Integrated National Disability Strategy (1997) supported the social 
model of disability and advocated for this approach to be incorporated into 
government policy across all sectors. The White Paper therefore criticised 
disability assessment practices in place at the time for being exclusively 
medically tested and not taking the social aspects of disability in actually 
determining ability to work.  
 
Although Section 9 of the Social Assistance Act of 1992 outlined the criteria for 
eligibility for disability grants, there was no clear definition of what classified as 
‘physical or mental disability’:   
 
‘9. A person is, subject to section 5, eligible for a disability grant, if he 
or she- 
(a) has attained the prescribed age; and 
(b) is owing to a physical or mental disability, unfit to obtain by virtue 
of any service, employment or profession the means needed to enable 
him or her to provide for his or her maintenance.’ 
 
In fact, since the introduction of disability grants in 1946, the concept of 
disability had never actually been formally defined in any of the social 
assistance legislation and related regulations. Although the definition of 
disability was vague, the Act required that an applicant’s disability be confirmed 
by a medical report, meaning that the assessment of disability was heavily 
biased towards medical diagnosis and the medical model of disability.  
 
‘The assessment is clearly done in the medical framework and does 
not consider the socio-economic impact of disability. The functional 
assessment is limited to physiological inabilities and does not extend 
to environmental factors and barriers to community participation’ 
(Guthrie and Sait, 2001: 93).  
 
In the 1990s a person was eligible for a grant if the degree of their disability was 
certified as greater than 50 percent on an open labour market (Brown, 1990: 31; 
Guthrie and Sait, 2001). The assumption that there is a norm of physiological 
function and that deviations from this norm can be measured in terms of a 
percentage of disability does not take into account social and economic factors 
that may act as barriers to people’s ability to participate in productive work 
(Schneider and Marshall, 1998; Kimani, 1999). Whilst the Workmen’s 
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Compensation Act 30 of 1941 and the Compensation for Industrial Injuries and 
Diseases Act 130 of 1993 that later replaced it provide a ‘meat chart’14 to 
categorise the degree of anatomic loss in workplace injuries, no such guidelines 
existed in the case of the DG (Lund, 1997). This meant that the judgement of 
what constituted 50 percent disablement was left to the discretion of medical 
officers. A general assessment of ‘fitness to work’ also did not take into account 
whether an applicant was able to carry out the type of work they were 
specifically trained for (Bredenkamp, 2001: 198) and it was not clear to what 
extent medical officers could or should take highly variable economic factors 
into account in assessing disability (de Villiers, 2002). This very one-
dimensional assessment also left no room for self-representation by people with 
disabilities in the application process (Guthrie and Sait, 2001).  
 
In addition, the 1992 Act referred only to physical or mental disability, 
excluding people with sensory impairments, often causing administrative 
problems for deaf or sight-impaired applicants. There was also no clear 
definition of and delineation between temporary and permanent disability, 
meaning that these decisions were often made arbitrarily. The temporary 
classification was frequently misapplied by officials and doctors and used as a 
‘convenient half-grant’ (de Villiers, 2006: 3) where they felt a permanent 
classification was not justified or where insufficient supporting evidence was 
supplied. There were also cases where people with temporary disabilities 
received permanent grants for conditions such as epilepsy, which are in theory 
manageable (Interview with SASSA Doctor, 2013).  
 
In the 1990s, given the spectre of a growing HIV epidemic and the lack of 
widely available anti-retroviral therapy, the White Paper on Social Welfare 
(1997) predicted an increased demand for disability benefits and there was 
growing concern in government about the possible burden that AIDS-sick 
people would have on the DG system (Department of Welfare, 1997a). 
Although disability grants were not technically available to people with chronic 
illness, people who were functionally disabled by illness were eligible, making it 
difficult to establish at which point someone with a chronic illness such as HIV 
should receive a grant. In the absence of proper guidelines, doctors were 
offering the grant on a temporary or permanent basis to people of varying levels 
of health and disability, creating confusion amongst applicants about who was 
eligible for grants.  
 
 
                                           
14
 A meat chart assigns a value to each body part and assists in categorising the severity of an 
injury. For example, in the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1941, the loss of an eye would 
result in 20% impairment, whilst the loss of a leg was valued at 70%.  
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Inconsistencies in the medical assessment process 
 
Given inadequate definitions and vague and unclear guidelines, state doctors 
struggled with conducting DG assessments (Baron, 1992; Segar, 1994; 
Schneider and Marshall, 1998). Most doctors are not adequately trained to 
determine impairment and functional capacity (Govender and Miiji, 2009: 229) 
and doctors are therefore more likely to assess disability in terms of the presence 
of a medical condition rather than actual limitations in activities of daily living 
(Interview with Margaret Schneider, 2013). Disability grants are also premised 
on the idea de Villiers (2002: 324) calls ‘economic disability’. Economic 
disability is a function of both medical disability and the relative availability of 
economic opportunities for persons with disabilities at any given time, a 
decision which medical doctors are not necessarily properly equipped to make. 
 
Although a national grants system was created in 1998, provinces remained 
responsible for administering grants and implementing grant policy. Without 
national guidelines, provinces operated their own systems very differently and 
used different application and medical forms and guidelines for the disability 
grant application process (Black Sash, 2000a; de Villiers, 2002). In most of the 
provinces guidelines for assessing disability were inadequate or did not exist at 
all (Lund, 1997).
15
 Without proper training, a clear definition of disability or 
clear universal guidelines for disability assessment, the system was subjective 
and arbitrary, resulting in confusion and inconsistency (Schneider and Marshall, 
1998: 49; Swartz and Schneider, 2006; Welfare and Population Portfolio 
Committee Minutes, 10 November 1999; Department of Welfare, 2000b; 
2000c). In a very small and non-representative study in the Cape Province, 
Baron (1992) presented one patient to 15 family practitioners and their 
assessments of his degree of disability ranged from 15-100 percent. In the same 
study all of the 20 doctors surveyed indicated that the DG assessment form was 
unclear and asked questions they were not able to answer (Baron, 1992).  
 
Qualitative research conducted into the disability grant application process in the 
1990s (Segar, 1994; Baron, 1992), as well as government documents and 
parliamentary discussions prior to 2000, all reveal concern about the pressure 
placed on doctors by the growing numbers of people seeking the DG. As already 
overworked medical officers were conducting assessments in addition to their 
regular workload, medical officers generally did not have time to properly 
consider each case and thus made rapid assessments (Schneider and Marshall, 
1998; Kimani, 1999). This meant that those with more obvious disabilities were 
more likely to receive grants. Schneider et al. (1999) found that people using 
                                           
15
 This came under attack in Msiza v Director of Social Security, North West Province 
Bophuthastswana HC 702/2001 
18 
 
assistive devices were significantly more likely to receive a DG than to not 
receive one. Given that the doctor had such influence over access to the grant, 
the process was further undermined by bribery, fraud and threats to doctors by 
people demanding the grant (Naicker, Welfare and Population Portfolio 
Committee Minutes, 21 June 2000).  
 
In a context of high poverty levels, it is difficult to distinguish between 
disability-related poverty and other generalised poverty and there was often 
confusion as to whether someone was receiving a grant because they were 
disabled or unemployable (Schneider and Marshall, 1998). This was often the 
case amongst applicants over the age of 55 who were not yet eligible for the Old 
Age Pension and were awarded temporary disability grants because were no 
longer competitive in the labour market (Schneider and Marshall, 1998). 
 
There were also emerging concerns that in a context of high unemployment 
people were using temporary disability grants as a ‘ticket’ (Segar, 1994) to an 
income. Segar’s (1994) ethnography of patient compliance to epilepsy 
medication in the epilepsy clinic of an Eastern Cape day hospital, developed on 
the basis of observations of patient consultations and interviews, indicates that 
patients were strategically using the illness to access the disability grant.  In the 
case of her study, patients and doctors became ‘locked into a kind of negotiation 
where the issues of disease and therapy may themselves become of secondary 
importance’ (Segar, 1994: 295). In a letter to the South African Medical Journal, 
a tuberculosis researcher focusing on patient compliance raised concerns that it 
was ‘financially advantageous for the indigent TB patient to remain in the ‘sick 
role’ for as long as possible’ (Dick, 1995), affecting adherence to treatment. In 
recommendations to the Department of Welfare, Schneider and Marshall (1998) 
recommended the elimination of the temporary disability grant for this reason. 
This strategic use of the disability grant to placed healthcare workers in a 
position of acting as both detectives and judges (Baron, 1992: 428), roles that 
were beyond the scope and training of their medical role.  
 
 
A new strategy on disability  
 
Although the INDS White Paper and the White Paper on Social Welfare 
recommend changes to improve and extend access to DGs, government took 
little action to change policy, legislation or regulations around the DG until 
1999/2000. In response to the obvious need to improve DG administration, the 
Department of Welfare convened a Disability Task Team including legal 
experts, academics, civil society and government representatives from the nine 
provinces to look at the existing legislation, regulations and implementation 
challenges (Department of Welfare, 2000c; Black Sash, 2000a). In June 2000 
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the Department of Welfare presented a new strategy on disability grants to the 
Department of Welfare and Population Development in Parliament (Department 
of Welfare, 2000b).  
 
‘The strategy attempts to address the concerns and difficulties with 
administration of social grants in respect of disability and attempts to 
involve the disability sector in the assessment panels, to assess 
applications for a social grant. The strategy proposes a clear definition, 
clear assessment criteria and uses a combination of the medical and 
social model in the assessment process. Applicants will no longer be 
forced to go to a medical officer of health for a medical report but can 
obtain a report from any doctor who is familiar with his/her medical 
history’ (Department of Welfare, 2000a).  
 
This strategy proposed amendments to the disability grant system which 
included: creating a new definition for disability, reducing reliance on medical 
officers who were often not present in rural areas, creating a timeframe for 
temporary disability and specifying an appeals process for those claimants 
opposing suspensions and rejections. The medical assessment process was 
considered time consuming, expensive and duplicative
16
 and the document 
recommended that this process be relaxed to allow any physician, psychiatrist, 
psychologist or optometrist of the applicant’s choice to make recommendations 
on grant applications. This report would however only form part of the process 
and multi-disciplinary adjudicating panels would perform the actual assessment. 
The multi-disciplinary nature of assessment panels (APs) were expected to move 
disability assessment away from a biomedical understanding of disability by 
incorporating more social considerations into assessment of applicants’ ability to 
work. This would bring the disability grant process in-line with the INDS White 
Paper (1997), which advocated a social model of disability. Including 
community members and the disability sector in the panels was expected to 
break the bias towards physical disability inherent in the medical examination.  
 
‘Practitioners other than medical practitioners, and community 
members who have had the opportunity to observe applicants over a 
long period of time, may, it was hoped, be better placed to detect 
‘invisible’ disabilities’ than would a medical practitioner forced to 
undertake a quick assessment, with limited resources’ (Swartz and 
Schneider, 2006: 239). 
 
                                           
16
As the grant had to be approved by both a medical officer and a pension medical officer 
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Given the shortage of medical doctors, especially in more rural areas, the DSD 
hoped that APs would help to reduce the large backlog of disability grant 
applications and reduce the growing threat of litigation against backlogs and 
unclear or improper processes for DG cancellations or classifications or 
permanent and temporary disability.  
 
Based on these proposals, amendments to the Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 
were introduced in September 2000, with the main purpose of the amendments 
explained by the Department of Social Development (DSD)
17
 as follows:   
 
‘To remove constraining factors towards administrative justice. 
Remove incentives for unscrupulous individuals to enrich themselves. 
Regulation to be aligned with a more developmental approach to 
empowering people with disabilities to become self-sustaining’ (DSD, 
2000).  
 
The DSD also hoped that introducing APs would decrease the individual 
discretion of doctors and thus the amount of perceived fraud present in the 
system. As the DSD Chief Director of Social Security, Fezile Makiwane, 
explained, ‘panels were mooted to shift the process of decision making from one 
individual to a group of persons’ (Makiwane, Social Development Portfolio 
Committee, 9 May 2001). 
 
‘Mr Makiwane did, however, agree with the Chair that the problem of 
fraudulent claims is a critical one and calls for a multisectoral 
approach. Capacity building by the government is needed to stamp it 
out. He hoped that with the setting up of the panel system the problem 
would abate to a considerable level’ (Makiwane, Social Development 
Portfolio Committee, 4 April 2001).  
 
The multi-disciplinary nature of APs was expected to increase the reliability and 
validity of assessments. According to the 2000 proposal APs consist of a senior 
social security official, a rehabilitation therapist (nurse, social workers, 
psychologist, occupational therapist or audio-visual therapist) and either a 
representative from the disability sector or other reputable community member.  
  
‘The idea, she underscored, was to incorporate people with the locus 
standi to testify to the applicant's disability status. The panels, she said 
                                           
17
 In July 2000 the Department of Welfare was re-named the Department of Social 
Development. At the beginning of 2001 the Welfare and Population Development Portfolio 
Committee in the National Assembly was re-named the Social Development Portfolio 
Committee.  
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further, are poised to inject some efficiency and reliability in the 
disability assessment process. The current set up is inadequate since it 
involves a single medical officer of health’ (Matholengwe, Social 
Development Portfolio Committee, 4 April 2001).  
 
Discussions around amendments of regulations to the Social Assistance Act 
highlighted the need to create a clear definition of disability for social grant 
purposes:  
 
‘The MP pointed out that the definition of disability needs to be made 
clear. Because of high unemployment, people are using this avenue to 
obtain money, especially by claiming temporary disability benefits. In 
terms of the definition of temporary disability, how would one 
differentiate gout from arthritis?’ (Unknown Member of Parliament,18 
Minutes of the Welfare & Population Development Portfolio 
Committee, September 27, 2000).  
 
Amendments made to the Regulations of the Social Assistance Act (Act 59 of 
1992) in July 2001 removed the role and regulatory function of the Pension 
Medical Officer, allowing assessors to function independently of their oversight. 
This amendment also introduced Assessment Panels (APs) as possible 
substitutes for Medical Officers (MOs) in areas where there were no medical 
officers. Further amendments were made in November 2001, which allowed 
APs to be used in all areas and for Care Dependency Grant assessments. 
According to the Regulations as amended in November 2001 an assessment 
panel was defined as ‘a group of individuals appointed by the Director-General 
in accordance with regulation 2(4), who have the relevant experience and 
expertise to assess disability and care dependency’.  
 
However, despite an obvious need to clearly define disability, no definition of 
disability was included in the amendments to the regulations.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
18
 This MP was not named in the Parliamentary Monitoring Group minutes. 
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A period of unbridled growth in DG 
beneficiaries: 2001 – 2007 
 
 
Outcomes of new regulations  
 
In a 1997 paper, Van der Berg commented that given the extent of 
unemployment in SA, the take-up of benefits such as the DG are likely to be as 
great as administrative leniency allows (Van der Berg, 1997: 494). This proved 
to be the case when 2001 amendments to the Social Assistance Act increased the 
leniency of DG administration, contributing significantly to the massive increase 
in beneficiaries from 2001 to 2007.  
 
As a result of the amendments, which came into effect in December 2001, 
provinces had two available routes for assessing disability for social grant 
purposes. Provinces could either continue to use medical officers without PMO 
oversight, or assessment panels could be used to make a final recommendation 
to social security officials. Although new regulations were aimed at improving 
DG administration, the removal of the PMO oversight function and the lack of 
training or guidelines for APs in fact further reduced the control the DSD had 
over the assessment process and created what one provincial official described 
as a ‘free for all’ (Delany et al., 2005). Although panels were meant to include 
medical professionals such as occupational therapists, physiotherapists, doctors 
and nurses, two APs in the North West Province observed in a study conducted 
by Goldblatt (2009) did not always include these professionals and panellists 
often did not understand medical reports (Goldblatt, 2009: 376). Based on legal 
casework, de Villiers (2002) also reported that APs worked off scantily detailed, 
poorly explained and often illegible medical reports. Without the presence of 
MOs, the panels were often incapable of weighting the value of the medical 
report relative to the psychosocial circumstances of the applicant (de Villiers, 
2002). Panels observed in Goldblatt’s (2009) study also lacked confidentiality 
and panel members were reported to be unprofessional. 
 
As the administration of grants was neither centralised nor standardised across 
provinces, different provinces introduced APs at different times and used them 
to varying degrees and in various combinations with MOs and PMOs. For 
instance Mpumalanga introduced three APs to work with MOs and retained an 
oversight role through a senior social security official. The Free State and 
KwaZulu-Natal eliminated the PMO role and ran dual systems that allowed 
either MOs or APs to make assessments. The North West and Limpopo 
provinces were most organised in implementing APs but also implemented quite 
different systems. The North West province introduced 26 APs linked to 26 
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social security offices that worked alongside MOs in the assessment process and 
were the only province to provide trainings for panel members. Limpopo 
situated APs within hospitals where they worked alongside the Medical Officer 
to recommend the grant, with the MO conducting the medical assessment 
component. On the other hand, the Western Cape and Gauteng never introduced 
APs. Gauteng abandoned the PMO function while the Western Cape retained it, 
although they could no longer override an MO recommendation. The Eastern 
Cape and Northern Cape briefly piloted APs but abandoned them for logistical 
reasons (Simchowitz, 2004), with the Northern Cape retaining its original 
system (with the PMO) and the Eastern Cape using MOs exclusively (Delany et 
al., 2005).  
 
Medical assessment forms and the criteria used to define AIDS-related disability 
also differed widely across provinces, with some provinces offering the DG very 
generously and others having no HIV/AIDS guidelines available until 2004 or 
later (Delany et al., 2005; Simkins, 2005; Nattrass, 2007).
19
  
 
Figure 1 below demonstrates the increase in beneficiaries between 2001 and 
2007, when the number of DG beneficiaries peaked at 1,442,808. The 
unexpectedly large increase in the number of disability grants from 2002 
onwards has been largely attributed to the 2001 regulatory changes 
(Simchowitz, 2004; Delany et al., 2005; Simkins, 2005; Nattrass, 2007).  Delany 
et al. (2005) reported that between October 2001 and September 2004 the 
number of permanent disability grants increased by 143percent and temporary 
disability grants increased by 61 percent, whilst the CDG uptake increased by 
119 percent. By 2007 over 1.4 million people accessed the DG, up from 600,000 
in 2001. SOCPEN data demonstrate that the percentage of rejected/not 
recommended applications dropped significantly from 8 percent in 1997 to less 
than 1 percent in March 2005 (Steele, 2006). In addition, of those who registered 
as rejected in March 1999 and who reapplied later, 60 percent were successful in 
claiming a DG (either a PDG 5% or TDG 55%) by March 2001 (Steele, 2006).  
 
                                           
19
 Northern Cape and Mpumalanga did not develop any guidelines and left assessment of HIV 
positive patients to the complete discretion of MOs. 
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Source: Department of Welfare and DSD Annual Reports 1997-2013. 
 
Figure 1 Changes in DG beneficiary numbers 1997-2013.  
 
In 2004, driven by anxiety about the budgetary implications of the growth in DG 
numbers, the DSD commissioned the Community Agency of Social Enquiry 
(CASE) to carry out new research into the increase in DG uptake (see Delany et 
al., 2005). The study employed a multi-stage, mixed-method approach. This 
included: 1) a review of policy and legislation; 2) the development of qualitative 
case studies at selected sites in all nine provinces through in-depth interviews 
with social security staff, doctors, AP members, beneficiaries and NGO staff; 3) 
a quantitative analysis of SOCPEN data; and 4) a review of the medical reports 
for a representative sample of files of new beneficiaries receiving the grant in 
the months of December 2001 and December 2003.  
 
This and other studies have attributed this growth to relaxation of grant 
assessment criteria, the reduction in oversight brought about by the elimination 
of Pension Medical Officers and introduction of Assessment Panels, the lack of 
a framework for assessments, the increase in the prevalence of HIV/AIDS and 
TB and high levels of unemployment (Delany et al., 2005; Simchowitz, 2004; 
Steele, 2006; Nattrass, 2007). According to these studies, the social aspects of 
disability applications became the strongest factor in applications and the 
disability grant was often awarded more out of sympathy on the basis of poverty 
than actual physical capability (Simchowitz, 2004; Delany et al., 2005; Simkins, 
2005; Nattrass, 2007). The confusion between medical diagnosis and actual 
functional capacity also meant that disability grants were often awarded to 
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people who may have been able to work. This was the case with HIV positive 
patients who were often given the temporary grant on the basis of their positive 
status rather than their actual fitness for work (Schneider and Goudge, 2007) and 
there appeared to be a popular perception that people with HIV/AIDS would 
automatically qualify for the disability grant (De Koker et al., 2006). As 
HAART was rolled-out from late 2003 and people with HIV/AIDS were able to 
recover their health, awarding the grant to those with HIV/AIDS became 
increasingly complicated and created further confusion around eligibility 
criteria. Rumours about possible disincentives towards recovery by TDG 
recipients continued to grow and was thought to create what Standing (2008: 22) 
called a ‘bizarre sickness-poverty trap’. Anecdotal evidence that TB and AIDS 
patients were reluctant to take medication that could restore their health or that 
people were incentivised to intentionally infect themselves with TB or 
HIV/AIDS have been presented in several research studies (Delany et al., 2005; 
Leclerc-Madlala, 2006; Nattrass, 2006; Hardy and Richter, 2006; De Paoli et al., 
2010; 2012). However, no quantitative evidence that beneficiaries would choose 
the grant over their health has been found (Venkataramani et al., 2010; Peltzer, 
2012).   
 
It should also be noted that temporary disability grant numbers increased as a 
result of the reinstatement of 35,529 temporary DGs, mainly in KwaZulu-Natal 
and the Western Cape, following the Mashishi class action
20
 in May 2003 as a 
result inappropriate lapsing procedures for TDGs (Steele, 2006; Delany et al., 
2005). The Mashishi ruling also halted further lapses of TDGs until correct 
review procedures were instituted. Given that most provinces only instituted 
these procedures between late 2004 and 2005, many TDG beneficiaries received 
their grants longer than initially intended.  
 
 
Tightening the assessment process 
 
As the result of such massive increases in the number of DG beneficiaries, all 
provinces except the North West Province abandoned the experiment with APs 
by 2004. Assessment Panels were formally removed from the regulations to the 
Social Assistance Act 59 of 1992 when the social security system was 
centralised through the new Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 and South Africa 
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 Mashishi and others v the Minister of Social Development and others, unreported Transvaal 
Provincial Division case number (4239/03) 2003.  
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Social Security Agency Act 9 of 2004.
21
 Regulations to the Act in 2005 and 
subsequent amendments in 2008 required that disability be exclusively 
determined by the medical assessment of medical officers and confirmed by a 
medical report. However, the oversight role of the PMO was never reintroduced.  
 
The purpose of the Social Assistance Bill [B57-2003] and the South African 
Social Security Agency Bill [B51-2003] was to consolidate the administration of 
social grants under one national agency and undo the assignment of social 
assistance functions to provinces, which had struggled to administer social 
grants. Both bills were introduced at a time when the report of the Committee of 
Inquiry into a Comprehensive System of Social Security for South Africa 
(known as the Taylor Committee) was still being considered by cabinet. This 
committee had been commissioned in 2000 to evaluate and propose a new 
design for the social security system in South Africa.  As no clear policy 
framework for social security reform (including reform of the disability grant) 
had yet been developed, civil society organisations suggested in submissions to 
the Social Development Portfolio Committee that the introduction of the bill 
was premature.  
 
The Taylor Committee report had raised some major issues related to the 
administration of the DG and the definition and assessment of disability and 
made a number of recommendations on radically reforming the DG system, 
none of which were included in the Bill and few of which have informed actual 
policy change. This is likely because the report recommended extending access 
and reducing the reliance on medical assessment, which may not have seemed 
appropriate given the failure of the AP system and growing panic about the 
number of DG beneficiaries. The Taylor Committee report had recommended 
that people with sensory and intellectual disabilities as well as those with 
chronic illnesses such as HIV/AIDS be eligible for the grant. It also 
recommended that the work capacity element of eligibility be removed and that 
a needs-based, capabilities-focused assessment based on the World Health 
Organisation’s International Classification of Impairment, Disability and 
Handicaps (ICIDH-2) be used for categorising and measuring disability. The 
report proposed that assessment be conducted by multi-disciplinary panels that 
included members of the disability sector and would not only consider medical 
diagnosis, but also other social, economic, physical and environmental factors. 
The report also suggested the development of a proper review and appeals 
system and the increase in back pay from three to six months. It also 
recommended that needs-based assessment replace means testing and that a 
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 The South African Social Security Agency Act of 2004 created the South African Social 
Security Agency (SASSA), which is the agency under the Department of Department of 
Social Development now responsible for the administration of all social grants.  
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sliding scale of monetary and in-kind benefits be introduced. The committee 
further recommended that relevant training and reintegration measures be tied to 
grants as part of the social security package.  
 
Although the new (2004) Social Assistance Act did not address problems in DG 
administration, the DSD quickly began to investigate ways to contain the growth 
of the grant. In order to contain the use of the Disability Grant as a poverty 
alleviation tool, the CASE report discussed earlier (Delany et al., 2005) 
recommended the introduction of standardised assessment tools, clear eligibility 
criteria and educating frontline staff about the rules of disability management. 
These recommendations were focused on ensuring that the disability grant was 
given exclusively to the people with functional impairments that limit their 
ability to participate in the labour market. However, by focusing on what 
Nattrass (2007: 184) describes as a ‘narrow set of managerial solutions’ and not 
the underlying social reasons for the growth in disability grant applications and 
the overgenerous awarding of grants by assessors, the state ignored an important 
message about the gaps in the social security system made obvious by demand 
for this grant.  
 
The issue of subjectivity in the medical assessment process raised in 2000 in the 
proposals for disability grant reform had not been solved by APs and the DSD 
therefore remained concerned that the process allowed personal views on who 
‘deserves’ social assistance to influence decision-making around disability 
grants. Although the DSD put out a tender for the development of a tool for DG 
assessment in 2003, piloting showed that the tool was too complex and 
theoretical for practical use (Margie Schneider Interview, 2013). Although APs 
were removed no useful tools, standardised guidelines or proper oversight yet 
existed for medical assessment by MOs and reports presented to parliament by 
the Special Investigating Unit (PMG Minutes, 2006) indicated that sympathy 
felt by doctors for their patients lead to overgenerous, even fraudulent behaviour 
on the part of the doctor.  
 
‘Referring to the disability fraud cases, he said that one of the main 
concerns were doctors who certified people as disabled even though 
they were not. Many of them get paid to do this. This was organised 
crime and was one of the focus areas at present. There were cases as 
well where doctors classified people as disabled because the case was 
not very clear and they felt sorry for them. People with AIDS were a 
problem as classification depended on their CD4 count and these 
counts could fluctuate’ (Waters, National Assembly Social 
Development Portfolio Committee, 30 Aug 2006). 
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The Report on Incentive Structures of Social Assistance Grants in South Africa, 
produced for the Department of Social Development in 2006 to investigate the 
possible unintended effects of grants, also noted that the increase in grants was 
not only driven by applicants but those referring or assessing them for disability 
grant applications:  
 
‘It is sometimes not the potential recipients themselves that respond in 
unanticipated ways to incentive structures. It may, for example, be 
gatekeepers such as doctors or social workers, or even social security 
staff, acting in the perceived best interests of their client’ (Steele, 
2006: iii). 
 
 
The Harmonised Assessment Tool  
 
In 2003 the Department of Health (DoH) introduced a Policy of Free Health 
Care at Hospitals for People with Disabilities, which offered free services to 
those with moderate to severe disabilities of a permanent nature.
22
 The need for 
doctors to assess patients’ eligibility for these free services led to growing 
irritation amongst healthcare professionals who were already struggling under 
the pressure of DG assessments. To simplify this process and overcome the 
ongoing lack of tools and guidelines for disability assessment, the DSD and 
DoH jointly developed a Harmonised Assessment Tool (HAT), which was 
piloted in 2006. The HAT was based on a definition of disability specifically 
created for determining eligibility for the DG and FHC, which was approved by 
Cabinet in May 2005.  The definition reads as follows:  
 
Disability means a moderate to severe limitation in a person’s ability to function 
or ability to perform daily activities as a result of physical, sensory, 
communication, intellectual or mental impairment.  
 
The definition clarifies that disability is neither a medical condition, nor the 
symptoms or impairments arising from a medical condition (DoH and DSD, 
2009). Instead disability is defined in terms of the limitations in daily 
functioning and activities that a person is able to perform. The HAT was 
designed to assess what activity or participation restrictions exist for each 
individual. The tool has two components, a medical assessment and an Activity 
Limitation Assessment. The medical assessment component would act to 
confirm the existence of particular health condition, whilst the Activity 
                                           
22
 This was introduced by Manto Tshabalala-Msimang, who was the Minister of Health at the 
time. 
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Limitation component assesses disability by measuring activity limitations in 
terms of specific categories of impairment through observation, information 
gathering through interviews and testing.
23
 The Activity Limitation Assessment 
would be undertaken by a registered health professional who had received 
specific training in use of the tool and related assessment guides (DoH and DSD, 
2009).
24
 This focus on activity limitations over medical diagnoses promised to 
shift the responsibility for assessment from doctors to other healthcare 
professionals who are better-trained in assessing functionality than doctors. This 
focus was expected to ensure that only genuinely disabled people received the 
grant and also make the assessment process more sensitive to hidden disabilities 
than had not been possible through medical assessment alone. The introduction 
of HAT would also bring the assessment process more in line with international 
guidelines such as the World Health Organisation’s International Classification 
of Functioning, Disability and Health (ICF).  
 
The DSD hoped that the introduction of the tool would ‘ensure uniformity in the 
assessment of disability, thereby contributing to more efficient management of 
disability benefits’ (PMG Minutes, National Assembly EPC, 28 March 2007). 
As well as reducing access to DGs by the chronically ill, which was seen by the 
DSD as a ‘major error of inclusion’ (DSD, 2010: 10), it was hoped that a more 
standardised process would also reduce the number of appeals against decisions 
and reduce the threat of litigation by applicants. The HAT was to be 
implemented in conjunction with SASSA’s plans for a Disability Management 
Model, which was also aimed at standardising provincial procedures for 
disability assessment.  
 
The disability rights movement, which promotes a multi-disciplinary approach 
to disability assessment and which had long opposed the use of medical doctors 
who are trained to focus on medical conditions rather than functionality, 
favoured the introduction of the HAT. The disability sector argued that disability 
grants should be specifically targeted at the permanently disabled rather than 
                                           
23
The tool measures categories of activity limitations in terms of self-care, elimination 
(including toileting), mobility differentiated in separated body parts, vision, hearing, 
communication (understanding and producing language), cognition (problem solving and 
memory), Global Assessment of Function (GAF) assessing spatial awareness and 
psychological or mental health (DSD, 2010). 
 
24
 The tool was designed to be used by a registered health professional and it was expected 
that audiologists, occupational therapists, physiotherapists or speech therapists would perform 
most AL assessments, but clinical psychologists, optometrists, orthotists and prosthetists or 
registered nurses were also able to perform assessments if necessary.    
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those with chronic diseases. ANC MP Henrietta Bogopane-Zulu,
25
 a vocal 
disability rights activist, made this argument in a number of parliamentary 
debates:  
 
‘Ms Bogopane-Zulu said that they had told the DSD many times that 
doctors should not be used to certify disabled people. A doctor could 
be used for a chronic illness, which was not a disability. She requested 
SASSA to address this. A disability was permanent normally and a 
panel should be used to certify disabled people. Those with AIDS 
should be classified as chronic and not as disabled’ (PMG Minutes, 
Social Development PC, 30 August, 2006). 
 
‘Ms Bogopane-Zulu suggested that a chronic illness grant be 
established for such a purpose, as such persons did not fit the profile 
for a disability grant’ (PMG Minutes, Social Development PC, 7 
September, 2005).  
 
With its strong emphasis on functionality, implementation of the HAT would 
imply that a significant number of people who had been accessing the grant 
based on their chronic illness would lose their grants.  
 
The Department of Social Development acknowledged that if the chronically ill 
were to be excluded by the new definition of disability and the HAT, some 
provision needed to be made for the chronically ill living in poverty. In 2007 the 
DSD commissioned the Human Science Research Council (HSRC) to 
investigate policy options to provide social security benefits to people with 
chronic illnesses. Research was based on a desktop review of national and 
international literature on the provision of social security for chronic conditions 
as well as a review of existing data sets on the prevalence of chronic conditions 
in South Africa.  
 
The HSRC report recommended two policy options: 1) the introduction of the 
HAT alongside a Chronic Illness Grant (CIG) for people with chronic illnesses 
not eligible for the DG; and 2) the roll-out of the HAT and provision of a 
coordinated set of general poverty alleviation programmes (Schneider and 
Goudge, 2007). The introduction of a Chronic Illness Grant (CIG) had already 
been recommended in the National Strategic Plan on HIV/AIDS drafted by the 
South African National AIDS Council (SANAC) and then approved by cabinet 
in 2007. The CIG was a popular option amongst AIDS activist organisations 
                                           
25
 Bogopane-Zulu is now Deputy Minister in the Department of Women, Children and People 
with Disabilities 
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such as the Treatment Action Campaign and National Association of People 
Living with AIDS.   
 
The DSD initially appeared supportive of the CIG option and according to 
Parliamentary Monitoring Group minutes, ‘it was felt that perhaps there was a 
need for a special chronic illness grant, or, as another option, the provision of 
food vouchers by the Department of Health’ (Rakoloti, Social Development 
Portfolio Committee, 2 November 2009). The DSD presented the CIG as a 
policy option to the Social Transformation Committee at the 2007 ANC Policy 
Conference, but this proposal was rejected. Although the committee 
acknowledged ‘the need to provide some form of safety net for those people, 
who do not have any income and are not eligible for any form of social grant 
under the existing policy framework’, the discussion was ‘characterised by a 
realisation by both commissions that the ANC in government should discourage 
dependence on social grants and therefore should seek to develop 
comprehensive measures to fight poverty’ (ANC Social Transformation 
Committee Minutes, 30 June 2007). As a result the committee decided that the 
chronically ill should continue to be excluded from the definition and that no 
social grant would be issued to the chronically ill. Instead responsibility for the 
chronically ill was seen as the mandate the Department of Health (DoH) and the 
Integrated Food and Nutrition Task Team (PMG Minutes, Social Development 
Portfolio Committee, 2 November 2009). A decision was made that food 
vouchers rather than grants would be provided to the chronically ill to ensure 
that they had adequate nutrition to ensure they would be able to adhere to their 
medication. 
 
 
The Social Assistance Act Amendment Bill of 
2010  
 
In order to make the implementation of a Harmonised Assessment Tool legally 
possible, it was necessary to insert a definition of disability into the Social 
Assistance Act 13 of 2004. In 2010, the Social Assistance Amendment Bill (B5-
2010) was introduced to parliament to insert the following definition of 
disability into the Act to support the implementation of the HAT.  
 
‘“disability”, in respect of an applicant, means a moderate to severe 
limitation to his or her ability to function as a result of a physical, 
sensory, communication, intellectual or mental disability rendering 
him or her unable to— 
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(a) obtain the means needed to enable him or her to provide for his or 
her own maintenance; or 
(b) be gainfully employed; 
 
According to the Minister of Social Development, the amendments were 
intended to create ‘a more rational and less arbitrary means of assessing 
disability through limiting the discretion of individual doctors and our officials’ 
(Dlamini, Social Development PC, 2 June 2010). The amendments would 
legally remove the right of the chronically ill to access disability grants. The 
DSD hoped that this would reduce inclusion errors and that fewer 
inconsistencies in DG assessment would reduce the backlog of appeal cases 
against the rejection of grant applications or lapsing of disability grants, which 
had remained an ongoing problem for the department in the absence of 
harmonised regulations. The Bill also sought to regulate the eligibility 
requirements for other disability-related grants, enable applicants and 
beneficiaries to apply to the SASSA to reconsider its decision and amend the 
process of appeals against SASSA’s decisions (Portfolio Committee on Social 
Development, 2010).   
 
Civil society organisations were invited to consult on the 2010 Bill through oral 
and written submissions. Their submissions suggest that these organisations 
were as concerned as the DSD about the administration of disability grants and, 
specifically, how doctors’ discretion lead to unequal applications of the law 
(AIDS Law Project, 2010; Black Sash, 2010; SPII, 2010; Treatment Action 
Campaign, 2010; South African Council of Churches). These submissions 
agreed that chronic diseases were presenting a challenge to social security 
programmes. However, those that submitted argued that the wording of the 
amendments not only did little to address the lack of clarity around the 
definition of disability, but that the definition and the application of HAT would 
be regressive in its exclusion of persons with chronic illnesses if no separate 
grant was provided for this group. Organisations that presented at the hearings 
argued that intentionally excluding groups of people already receiving DGs from 
accessing social security was counter to the state’s obligation to take reasonable 
legislative measures to achieve the progressive realisation of social security 
rights as outlined in Article 27(2) of the Bill of Rights in the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (Act 108 of 1996).  
 
Disability organisations, the Disability Action Research Team and Disabled 
People South Africa, made no comment on the issue of chronic illness and only 
recommended that ‘impairment’ be used to replaced disability in the definition 
of disability. The argument against the proposed amendments was led by a 
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coalition of NGOs
26
 outside of the disability sector that argued that the Act 
should make provision for a chronic illness grant in recognition of the daily 
struggle against illness and poverty that chronically ill people face.  
 
Civil society organisations argued that although incorporating the chronically ill 
into the labour market was an important goal, given high levels of 
unemployment and the inability of the chronically ill to compete in it, the 
majority of the people concerned were not employed anyway and that excluding 
them from social assistance would only increase poverty and hunger rather than 
push them into the labour market. The discourse employed by civil society in the 
debates around the bill recognises that chronically ill people face dual 
disadvantages of illness and poverty and are therefore deserving of grants. 
Underpinning this discourse is the belief that social grants have ‘transformative’ 
potential and as well as the ability to promote inclusion and social justice 
(Devereux, 2010). The Chronic Illness Grant was seen as a way to create 
independence by supporting people with chronic conditions to lead healthy 
lifestyles, which would allow them to participate in society as active citizens and 
potentially find work.  
 
Employing a conflicting discourse, one that sees grants as creating dependency 
and work disincentives rather than development, members of the Social 
Development Portfolio Committee argued that failures of the labour market and 
the burden of chronic illness should not be addressed through social grants. In 
their view, unemployment and poverty were not the exclusive problems of the 
DSD thus an intersectoral approach was necessary and, therefore, discussions 
about these issues were not relevant to the amendments at hand. Issues around 
exclusion of the chronically ill, especially those with HIV/AIDS, were seen as 
part of a bigger labour market issue which should be addressed by employer 
education programmes and job creation strategies rather than social grants.  
 
Whilst the Portfolio Committee on Social Development accepted a 
recommendation that impairment rather than disability be used within the 
definition of disability, it ultimately rejected the idea of a chronic illness grant 
and aimed to proceed with the Bill as planned.  
 
As the Department of Health would be responsible for conducting assessments, 
it was invited to present to the committee on its readiness to implement HAT. 
To the surprise of the committee, the DoH indicated that not only did it have 
insufficient healthcare professionals such as medical doctors, occupational 
                                           
26
This group included the Treatment Action Campaign, the AIDS Law Project, Black Sash, 
DART, DPSA, NAPWA, SPII and the South African Council of Churches.  
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therapists and physiotherapists to conduct these assessments, but that it had no 
trained professionals outside of the sites where the HAT was initially piloted. 
The DoH therefore declared it was not ready to implement the tool. However, 
the DoH promised that it was addressing the issue of chronic diseases and 
disability through prevention and health promotion efforts aimed at reducing 
risky behaviour that could lead to illness or disablement.  
 
As a result of the DoH’s presentation, all six sections of the bill relating to 
disability were ultimately excluded from the bill. The DSD is currently re-
developing the HAT to address the issue of chronic illness in disability grant 
assessment more adequately. SASSA have reported there has been no 
substantive change in the status quo and that they are still not clear as to when or 
if they will be able to implement the tool (Personal correspondence with SASSA 
Disability Management Unit, 2013). A doctor contracted to SASSA indicated 
that the problem with the HAT tool ‘starts and ends with the Department of 
Health’ and that ‘while the theory is nice, the practicality is not so 
straightforward’ (Interview with SASSA Doctor, 2013) because the healthcare 
system is unlikely to have the capacity to carry out Activity Limitations 
assessments for some time. As a result, the disability grant assessment process 
remains purely medically focused.  
 
 
The Disability Management Model 
 
During the 2007/2008 financial year the DSD and SASSA drafted guidelines for 
a Disability Management Model to standardise the medical assessment 
processes for the DG, CDG and Grant-in-Aid in all the regions and improve 
control over assessors and the standard of assessments.  
 
The new model was piloted in the Eastern Cape, Free State and KwaZulu-Natal 
regions in 2008/2009 and the following year SASSA implemented changes in 
priority areas of the model in six regions across the country. These priority areas 
include: a gatekeeping and national booking procedure that detects rejected 
applicants reapplying before the required three month waiting period, 
standardised medical assessment processes, medical form management, training 
for assessors and the implementation of claims procedures for service providers 
(SASSA, 2011).  
 
Despite the failure of its attempt to change legislation and implement HAT, the 
SASSA Disability Management Unit has continued to roll out processes focused 
on reducing DG numbers and eliminating discretion in the assessment process 
(SASSA, 2011). The agency has implemented a number of oversight measures 
and has decreased the relative influence of medical officers in the assessment 
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process. As the model is progressively implemented, the role of the patient’s 
own doctor will be limited to the pre-screening process and will only be able to 
provide a referral letter on a SASSA referral form template. SASSA officials 
then use this and other documentation to book an applicant for a formal 
disability assessment with a formal disability assessor. SASSA now appoints 
specifically contracted medical assessors, either through Memorandum of 
Understandings (MOUs) with Provincial Health Departments and healthcare 
facilities for assistance in conducting disability assessments, or by contracting 
medical assessors directly. These assessors should be specifically trained by 
SASSA in the application of their specific procedures, but assessors are able to 
begin assessing grants after only few hours of training. Medical assessors use a 
standardised form (ICD10) and very specific guidelines are given to assessors 
during training that indicates which conditions or impairments are considered 
for grants and what percentage of impairment is required before the disability 
grant is offered.
27
 Grant assessors make their decisions on a purely medical basis 
and typically conduct a folder review, although they may ask patients questions 
or perform medical examinations or tests if required. Doctors who are contracted 
by the Department of Health typically work for corporate locum agencies and 
have little incentive to conduct high quality assessments. SASSA does however 
perform periodic reviews on doctors to track the quality of their work and 
reduce non-compliance with assessment guidelines.  
 
The SASSA Guidelines for the Medical Assessment of Disability for Social 
Assistance Purposes contain particular sections reinforcing which conditions do 
not qualify applicants for disability grants or care-dependency grants. The 
guidelines discourage awarding the grant for chronic diseases by focusing very 
specifically on functional impairment and the awarding of Temporary Disability 
Grants is discouraged, based on ideas about limiting dependency.   
 
‘Unfortunately there is a tendency for temporary grants to create 
dependency and poor motivation for recovery. Due to this component 
of secondary gains these grants must be given out cautiously’ 
(SASSA, n.d.: 25).   
 
These guidelines also actively discourage doctors from recommending grants on 
a humanitarian basis.  
 
‘Disability grant is not [the] Basic Income Grant (Employability not 
Availability of Employment)’ (SASSA, 2012). 
                                           
27
 Significant impairment (25-40%): patient qualifies depending on age, functional 
independence, education and employment history and socioeconomic factors or opportunities 
for referral. Major impairment (over 40%):  patient automatically qualifies. 
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‘Certainly most of our population live in very poor social 
circumstances that cause a lot of suffering, but this alone does not 
constitute grounds for a disability grant’ (SASSA, n.d.: 5).  
 
In its 2012/13 annual report, the DSD claims that the proficiency of assessors 
has improved significantly, this led to ‘purging of ineligible beneficiaries during 
medical reviews and a general decline in inclusion errors’. This resulted in a net 
decrease of 20 789 in the total number of disability-related grants
28
 in the 
2012/13 period (DSD, 2013: 138). Overall, as result of the efforts of the DMM, 
the number of beneficiaries has been reduced by 20.8 percent from 1.44 million 
in 2007 to 1.14 million people in 2013. 
  
 
Social security reform and the promise of a new 
system  
 
The government has struggled to accurately target disabled people for receipt of 
DGs because the chronically ill and the able-bodied unemployed sitting on the 
margins of the social security system have also attempted to access DGs, 
sometimes with the help of sympathetic social workers, doctors and government 
officials. Without a coherent policy on social assistance or the political will to 
extend social grants to these groups, combined with a failure to create jobs, 
these problems have been difficult to resolve, even with increased regulation of 
the DG. Although there has been some ‘parametric reform’ (Seekings and 
Matisonn, 2010) and extension of the social grant system there has been little 
actual reform in the social grant system since the end of apartheid. This 
historical overview of the DG has demonstrated that despite efforts to change 
the DG system and significant improvement in administration, both the DG 
system and the context in which it operates remain substantially similar to the 
system inherited from the apartheid regime. However, there are plans for future 
social security reform, largely through improved social insurance provisioning 
that may change the nature of social security provisioning for the disabled in 
future years.  
 
The South African National Development Plan, the state’s latest blueprint for 
creating social and economic change, has a strong focus on reducing poverty 
and inequality through social protection. The diagnostic report prepared by the 
National Planning Committee (NPC) on social protection acknowledges the role 
that social grants have played in reducing poverty and social unrest. The plan 
recognises that ‘there is no protection for able-bodied unemployed people in 
                                           
28
 This also includes the care-dependency grant and the grant-in-aid.  
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South Africa who have little choice but to depend on ‘goodwill transfers’ from 
those with access to income through employment or some form of social grant’ 
(NPC, 2012: 327) and that the dependency on social grant recipients dilutes the 
anti-poverty effects of social grants. The plan looks beyond social grants 
towards the development of a comprehensive social protection offering by the 
state. This social protection ‘basket’ includes National Health Insurance, 
unemployment insurance, pension fund arrangements, education, public work 
programmes, work related benefits, food and nutrition security programs and 
labour market incentives. It acknowledges in particular the importance of social 
protection for the able-bodied unemployed:  
 
‘The main thrust of social policies should be to enable and support 
labour market participation and provide protection against labour 
market risks including the loss of employment. Social protection is 
also essential to protecting the old and the young as well as adults of 
working age who are unable to work because of structural 
unemployment, illness or disability’ (NPC, 2012: 327, emphasis 
own). 
 
The National Development Plan also ties in with the plans of the Inter-
ministerial Committee on Social Security and Retirement Reform. This 
committee was established in 2007 and is composed of the National Treasury, 
DSD, Department of Labour, Department of Transport, Department of Home 
Affairs and Department of Public Services Administration. The aim of the 
committee is to drive social security reform by consolidating and extending 
social insurance provisioning. In 2011/2012 the committee published the 
Consolidated Government Paper (CGP), a policy discussion document that 
outlines the government’s vision for improving the social security system (DSD, 
2012) and in June 2012 a Position Paper on Social Security Reform was 
presented to the Cabinet for consideration (DSD, 2013). These documents 
proposed introducing the National Social Security Fund, a mandatory state 
contributory pension, death, unemployment and disability insurance system that 
will reduce the burden that income shocks and inadequate pension planning put 
on the state.  
 
Although the government will continue to provide the Disability Grant to those 
who have been unable to contribute to the social insurance scheme due to 
unemployment, the state will be moving the risk of disablement from the state to 
individuals who are in the position to contribute to public social insurance 
schemes. Better social insurance provisioning for disability, illness and general 
unemployment would significantly reduce pressure on the disability social grant 
system.  Although these plans have been in development for several years, 
cabinet has delayed moving forward with a broader consultative process until it 
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has had more opportunity to explore the implications of the complex proposals 
and consider the needs of expectations of those working in the informal sector 
that do not have regular incomes (DSD, 2013: 56). Although new social 
insurance reforms remains a long-term goal, the DSD and SASSA do not appear 
to have any plans to change the existing DG system in the more immediate 
future.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Before moving onto some concluding thoughts, a brief overview of the history 
of the DG from 1990 to 2013 is provided below.   
 
Although racial parity in the value of social grants was achieved in 1993, the 
ANC government inherited a highly fragmented, unequal and poorly managed 
social grant system from the apartheid government. Large differences in the 
social grant systems existed within the 14 different welfare bureaucracies that 
managed grants towards the end of apartheid. The ANC government was tasked 
with both amalgamating this system and extending access to black people 
previously excluded by racial and geographic inequality and poor service 
delivery. Although during the late 1990s the number of DG recipients was 
effectively reduced by a process of consolidating and cleaning social grant 
databases, the overall intention of the Department of Welfare during this period 
was to extend access to all grants, including the DG.  
 
In 2001, problems in the medical assessment of DG eligibility, severe backlogs 
in the application and appeals process and a commitment to the social model of 
disability, led the Department of Welfare to introduce a new set of regulations 
for the Social Assistance Amendment Act of 1992. These amendments 
introduced Assessment Panels for the assessment of disability and eliminated the 
role of the Pension Medical Officer, effectively reducing the level of oversight 
in the assessment process. Largely as a result of increased leniency and poor 
management of the disability assessment process, there was a rapid increase in 
temporary DGs between 2001 and 2007.  
 
Concerned by the cost implications of such rapid growth in beneficiaries, APs 
were removed and disability is again exclusively medically tested. The DSD and 
its implementing agency, SASSA, have also embarked on a series of efforts to 
better regulate the DG application and assessment process and constrain 
opportunities for differentiated interpretations of disability and the level of 
discretion in the system overall. This work has included the development of 
standardised tools and training, attempts to better define disability within 
legislation and increased oversight of medical officers and SASSA 
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administrative staff through a recently introduced Disability Management 
Model. As a result of these efforts, the number of beneficiaries has been reduced 
by 20.8 percent from 1.44 million in 2007 to 1.14 million people in 2013.   
 
Instead of focusing on systemic issues, regulation of the DG has been focused 
on defining and guarding the boundaries of disability to ensure that the grant is 
properly targeted at those who are functionally disabled. This has however 
proved extremely difficult in a context of high poverty-driven demand for the 
grant and a high burden of chronic illness. Although the DSD has made attempts 
to move away from pure medical assessment of grants, the complexities and 
costs of assessing activity limitations and their relation to social, economic 
context and the physical environment, are too high for the current healthcare or 
social security system to manage effectively. This has meant that the state has 
remained stuck with largely the same system that has been in place since 
apartheid. Although the DSD and SASSA now have greater oversight and 
control of the assessment process, uneven application of assessment criteria 
continues due to ‘grey areas’ within the assessment process.  
 
Many changes to the regulation of social grant policy and efforts to extend rights 
to social security through the legal, policy and programmatic roll-out of 
resources have been driven reactively by legal action by disgruntled applicants 
and beneficiaries (South African Human Rights Commission, 2010). This lack 
of motivation to reform the whole social grant system approach appears to be as 
a result of a government discourse that has been strongly dominated by talk of 
the dangers of a ‘culture of handouts’ and ‘dependency’ on the state and fears 
about the financial sustainability of the system (Surender et al., 2010; Meth, 
2004; Seekings and Matisonn, 2010; Barchiesi, 2011a, 2011b).  
 
Aside from documenting a litany of regulatory failures, what this historical 
account of DG regulation demonstrates is that regardless of how disability and 
chronic illness are defined or measured, the conversation on how to incorporate 
people whose participation in society is limited by their physical capabilities 
cannot be separated from a wider conversation about poverty in South Africa. 
Without adequate protection to support everyone living in or at risk of falling 
into poverty, the disability grant system has served a purpose for which it was 
not originally intended. According to Whitworth et al. (2006):  
 
‘The most effective systems of social protection for those with a 
disability are those which are buttressed by a comprehensive safety 
net. This reduces the possibility of moral hazard, tackles chronic 
poverty and destitution and provides a more effective bridge into the 
labour market when peoples’ health improves and the labour market 
conditions permit’ (Whitworth et al., 2006: 41).  
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While trying to control administration of the grant is important, in the process of 
trying to define disability more narrowly, the political and public debate has lost 
sight of the objectives of the DG, which is to  ‘provide individuals with the 
means to disrupt forces which maintain their predicament of chronic 
impoverishment’ (Andrews et al., 2006). The focus on cutting out people who 
do not deserve the grant has distracted policymakers and legislators from 
developing a disability grant system that promotes the inclusion and 
development of disabled people in society.  
 
Without more jobs or a social security system that better serves the able-bodied 
unemployed, the fundamental underlying issue of people, both disabled and non-
disabled, needing a ‘foot-up’ out of poverty will not disappear and neither will 
the high demand for disability grants or ongoing pressure on DG recipients to 
support entire households with their grant incomes. Although the Disability 
Grant has the potential to promote the livelihoods of those suffering from 
permanent or temporarily disabling conditions, if it is used for general 
household maintenance DG recipients remain trapped in poverty and an unfair 
burden is placed on a category that the state has explicitly defined as vulnerable. 
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Appendix: Gaps in Disability Grant Data Available from 1990 to 1997  
 
 DG beneficiaries Expenditure on DG (R 
million) 
Total social grant beneficiaries  Expenditure social grants  
1990  R827.8 million (Van De 
Berg, 1994; Lund, 1992 
based on data from Dept 
of National Health and 
Population Development) 
 
 R3.9 billion (Van Der Berg, 1994; 
Lund, 1992 on data from Dept of 
National Health and Population 
Development) 
 
1991 803 000 (HSRC, 1992 in SAIRR, 
1993) # 
 3.9 million (HSRC, 1992 in SAIRR, 
1993) # 
R4.4 billion (HSRC, 1992 in SAIRR, 
1993) 
 
R4.7 billion (Lawrence, 1992, source 
of data unreported)  
1992    R5.2 billion (Lawrence, 1992, source 
of data unreported)  
1993 499 200 (Van De Berg, 1994, based 
on data from Dept of National 
Health and Population Development 
*) 
 
548 224** (Dept of Welfare, 1995)  
 
593 162 (Office of the Deputy 
President, 1997, source of data 
unreported) 
 
500 599 (SA Statistics, 2001: 6:1-3) 
R1.82 billion (SA 
Statistics, 2001: 6:1-3)  
2.5 million (Van de Berg, 1994 based 
on data from Dept of National Health 
and Population Development) 
 
2.6 million (SAIRR, 1995, based on 
Dept of Welfare data)  
R8.3 billion (Dept of Welfare, 1993, 
budgeted for 1993/1994*****) 
 
R8.3 billion (SA Statistics, 2001: 6:1-
3) 
 
 
1994 593 162*** (SAIRR, 1995, based on 
Dept of Welfare data)  
R7.6 billion (SAIRR, 
1995, based on Dept of 
2.4 million^^ (Seekings & Matisonn, 
2010, based on data from SA 
R10.5 billion (SA Statistics, 2001: 
6:1-3) 
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545 760 (SA Statistics, 2001: 6:1-3) 
Welfare data)  
 
R2.42 billion (SA 
Statistics, 2001: 6:1-3) 
Statistics, 2001: 6:1-3)  
 
2.8 million (SAIRR, 1995, based on 
Dept of Welfare data) 
 
3.6 million (Dept of Welfare, 1994) # 
 
R10.7 billion (Dept of Welfare, 1994) 
 
R13 billion^^ (Lund, 1997)  
1995   2.8 million**** (Dept of Welfare, 
1997a)  
R10.7 billion (SAIRR, 1995 based on 
Social Welfare Budget for 
1994/95)^^^ 
1996   2.8 million (Dept of Welfare, 1996) R11.5 billion (Dept of Welfare, 1996)  
 
R10.8 billion (SAIRR, 1995 based on 
Social Welfare Budget for 
1995/1996^^^) 
 
 
1997 732 322 (Dept of Welfare, 1997b; 
Dept of Welfare, 1997c) 
 
711 609 (DSD, 2008)  
 
732 322 (SA Statistics, 2001: 6:1-3) 
R3.1 billion (Dept of 
Welfare, 1997b)  
 
2.6 billion (Dept of 
Welfare, 1997c)  
2.9 million (Dept of Welfare, 1997b) 
 
 
R12.4 billion (Dept of Welfare, 
1997c) 
 
R12 billion (Dept of Welfare, 1997b)  
 
 
Much of the data was collected at different points in time during the year and this may have contributed to smaller 
discrepancies in data. Where the specific date is available this has been noted.  
 
# Data from the HSRC report and the Department of Welfare Annual Report present the only really dramatic differences in 
data presented in this table. In the case of the HSRC 1990 data it is unlikely that the number of beneficiaries dropped 
dramatically between 1990 and 1993 given that the amalgamation and clean-up process only began in later years. The same 
applies to the Department of Welfare 1994 report. It is therefore presumed that other data presents a more accurate 
representation of the number of beneficiaries.  
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*This figure does not include grants for blind people (18 700). Using this data Lund (1997) presents 518 000 as the total 
number of disabled beneficiaries because she added the 18 700. It is likely that most other figures include blind person’s 
grants. Some figures may also include the single care grant available to the carers of the disabled, but the difference this 
should make to the data is negligible - in 1993 only 2100 received this grant. It was also often not included because it was 
usually administered through the health rather than the welfare budget.  
 
** September 1993  
 
*** September 1994. The same figure is presented by the Department of Welfare as the 1993 figure. This may be because 
the data would have been reported in the 1993/1994 report but is generally collected at the end of the period. This may have 
caused confusion.  
 
****As of 31 May 1995  
 
***** R7.6 billion was allocated for the year with an additional R694 million allocated to eliminate racial disparities in 
social grants, effective from September 1993.  
 
^ First post-election budget for social security  
 
^^ This figure excludes State Maintenance Grants to Mothers, meaning that only children receiving the SMG are counted 
and their mothers. Also mothers accounts for an additional 200 000 beneficiaries and double-counting in this way would 
increase the figure to 2.6 million. This indicates that other figures provided over this period may be counting both mothers 
and children.   
 
^^^ Based on budgeted expenditure  
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